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Abstract
We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, that is a MIMO broadcast
channel where the transmitter sends some confidential information to one
user which is a legitimate receiver, while the other user is an eavesdropper.
Perfect secrecy is achieved when the the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver can communicate at some positive rate, while insuring that the
eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. In this paper, we compute the
perfect secrecy capacity of the multiple antenna MIMO broadcast channel,
where the number of antennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter and
the two receivers.
1 Introduction
Security in wireless communication is a critical issue, which has recently at-
tracted a lot of interest. By nature, wireless channels offer a shared medium,
particularly favorable to eavesdropping. Among the numerous points of view
from which security has been investigated, we adopt here the one of informa-
tion theoretic security. In this context, most of the works dealing with wireless
communication are based on the seminal work of Wyner [16], and its model, the
wire-tap channel.
1.1 Information theoretic confidentiality
In a traditional confidentiality setting, a transmitter (Alice) wants to send some
secret message to a legitimate receiver (Bob), and prevent the eavesdropper
(Eve) to have knowledge of the message.
From an information theoretic point of view, the communication channel
involved can be modeled as a broadcast channel, following the wire-tap channel
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model introduced by Wyner [16]: a transmitter broadcasts its message, say
wk ∈ Wk, encoded into a codeword xn, and the two receivers (the legitimate
and the illegitimate) respectively receive yn and zn, the output of their channel.
The knowledge that the eavesdropper gets of wk from its received signal zn is
modeled by
I(zn;wk) = h(wk)− h(wk|zn),
since the mutual information measures the amount of information that zn con-
tains about wk. The notion of perfect secrecy captures the idea that whatever
are the resources available to the eavesdropper, they will not allow him to get
a single bit of information. Perfect secrecy thus requires
I(zn;wk) = 0 ⇐⇒ h(wk) = h(wk|zn).
In other words, the amount of randomness is the same in wk or in wk|zn.
The decoder computes an estimate wˆk of the transmitted message wk, and
the probability Pe of decoding erroneously is given by
Pe = Pr(w
k 6= wˆk). (1)
The amount of ignorance that the eavesdropper has about a message wk is called
the equivocation rate, and following the above discussion, it is naturally defined
as:
Definition 1 The equivocation rate Re at the eavesdropper is
Re =
1
n
h(wk|zn),
with 0 ≤ Re ≤ h(wk)/n. Clearly, if Re is equal to the information rate h(wk)/n,
then I(zn|wk) = 0, which yields perfect secrecy.
To perfect secrecy is associated a perfect secrecy rate Rs, which is the amount
of information that can be sent not only reliably but also confidentially, with
the help of a (2nRs , n) code.
Definition 2 A perfect secrecy rate Rs is said to be achievable if for any ǫ > 0,
there exists a sequence of (2nRs , n) codes such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ), we have
Pe ≤ ǫ (2)
Rs − ǫ ≤ Re. (3)
The first condition (2) is the standard definition of achievable rate as far as
reliability is concerned. The second condition (3) guarantees secrecy, up to the
equivocation rate, which we will require to be h(wk)/n to have perfect secrecy.
The secrecy capacity is defined similarly to the standard capacity:
Definition 3 The secrecy capacity Cs is the maximum achievable perfect se-
crecy rate.
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1.2 Previous work
In his seminal work [16], Wyner showed for discrete memoryless channels that
the perfect secrecy capacity is actually the difference of the capacity of the two
users. To prove this result, he worked under the assumption that the channel of
the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the channel of the legitimate receiver.
This result has been generalized to Gaussian channels by Leung et al. [7], under
the same assumption.
The wire-tap channel has been adopted as a model for numerous works on
information theoretic security, and in particular for those on fading channels,
both for point-to-point and multi-user systems. We mainly review the prior
work for point-to-point. In [5], Gopala et al. have shown that the secrecy ca-
pacity is also the difference of the two capacities in the case of a single antenna
fading channel, under the assumption of asymptotically long coherence inter-
vals, when the transmitter either knows both channels or only the legitimate
channel. When only the legitimate channel is known, an optimal power allo-
cation is given, using a variable rate transmission scheme. In [1], Barros et al.
have characterized information theoretic security in terms of outage probabil-
ity. In the case when the transmitter does not know the eavesdropper channel,
they define the probability of transmitting at a secrecy rate RS bigger than the
secrecy capacity CS (i.e. the outage probability) as the probability that the
information theoretic security is compromised. They compute this probability,
and also show that the probability that the secrecy capacity CS is positive can
actually be positive even if the average SNR of the legitimate channel is weaker
than the one of the eavesdropper. They extend their work in [2], where they
also consider the cases when Alice has either imperfect or perfect knowledge of
the eavesdropper channel. Independently, Liang et al. [12] and Li et al. [10]
have computed the secrecy capacity for the parallel wiretap channel with inde-
pendent subchannels, and derived optimal source power allocation. The secrecy
capacity of the wiretap channel with single antenna fading channel follows. Fi-
nally, the results of [12] are extended in [13], where a fading broadcast channel
with confidential messages is considered, with common information for two re-
ceivers, and confidential information intended for only one receiver. The secrecy
capacity is computed for the parallel broadcast channel with both independent
and degraded subchannels.
In this work, we are interested in the perfect secrecy capacity of multiple
antenna channels. A first study of the problem has been proposed by Hero
[8]. In a different context than the wire-tap channel, he introduced the so-called
constraints of low probability of detection, and low probability of intercept, con-
sidering the scenario where the transmitter and the receiver are both informed
about their channel while the eavesdropper is uniformed about his. In [9], the
SIMO wiretap channel has been considered. Several results on the secrecy in
MIMO communication have been provided very recently. In [11], the secrecy
capacity is computed for the MISO case. Furthermore, a lower bound is com-
puted in the MIMO case. This lower bound, that is the achievability, is shown
to be the expected result, namely, the difference of the two channel capacities,
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like in the previous cases. Finally, the secrecy capacity for the MISO case has
been proven independently by Khisti et al. [6], where furthermore an upper
bound is given for the MIMO case, in a regime asymptotic in SNR.
The contribution of this paper is to compute the perfect secrecy capacity
of the multiple antenna wire-tap channel, for any number of transmit/receive
antennas, as well as for any SNR regime. One of the difficulties in studying the
MIMO wire-tap channel is that the broadcast MIMO channel is not degraded, an
assumption which is crucial in the proof of the converse in the original paper by
Wyner (as well as in the proofs presented in [7, 5, 1, 12]). In order to compute
the secrecy capacity, we provide a proof technique for the converse, which is
different than the original one, and allows us to deal with channels that are not
degraded. Note that our result shows that the inner bound by Li et al. [11] is
tight, and this is proved by the computation of an upper bound that actually
matches the lower bound.
1.3 The MIMO wiretap channel
We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, that is, a broadcast channel where the
transmitter is equipped with n transmit antennas, while the legitimate receiver
and an eavesdropper have respectively nM and nE receive antennas. Thus, our
model is described by the following broadcast channel
Y = HMX + VM
Z = HEX + VE
where Y, VM and Z, VE are respectively nM×1 and nE×1 vectors. The notation
that we will use throughout the paper is that the subscriptM refers to the main
channel (the one of the legitimate receiver), while the subscript E refers to the
eavesdropper channel. We will denote by In the n× n identity matrix, and by
0n the n × n all zero matrix. We may omit the subscript if the dimension is
obvious.
We make the following assumptions:
• X is the n× 1 transmitted signal, with covariance matrix KX  0n satis-
fying the power constraint
Tr(KX) = P.
The power constraint holds for the whole paper, and we may sometimes
omit to repeat it explicitly.
• HM and HE are respectively nM × n and nE × n fixed channel matrices
such that
H∗MHM ≻ 0n, H∗EHE ≻ 0n.
They are assumed to be known at the transmitter.
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• VM , VE are independent circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vectors
with identity covariance KM = InM , KE = InE and independent of the
transmitted signal X .
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel is given by
CS = max
KX0
log det(I+HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E)
where Tr(KX) = P . The paper contains the proof of the above theorem: in
Section 2, we prove an achievability result which characterizes the optimal ma-
trices K˜X , while Section 3 contains the main results, namely the proof of the
converse.
2 On the Achievability
In this section, we state the achievability part of the secrecy capacity, and further
prove that in the non-degraded case, the achievability is maximized by n × n
matrices KX which are low rank, that is of any rank r < n.
Proposition 1 The perfect secrecy rate
Rs = max
KX0,Tr(KX )=P
log det(I+HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E)
is achievable.
This has already been proved [11]. In fact, the interpretation is obvious. When
KX is chosen, the difference between the resulting mutual informations to the
legitimate user and eavesdropper can be secretly transmitted.
Proposition 2 Let K˜X be an optimal solution to the optimization problem
maxKX log det(I+HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E)
s.t. KX  0, Tr(KX) = P,
where H∗EHE −H∗MHM is either indefinite or semidefinite. Then K˜X is a low
rank matrix.
Proof. In order to show that the optimal K˜X is low rank, we define a
Lagrangian which includes the power constraint, and show that this yields no
solution. From there, we can conclude that the optimal solution is on the
boundary of the cone of positive semi-definite matrices, namely matrices of
rank r < n.
We thus define the following Lagrangian:
log det(InM +HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(InE +HEKXH∗E)− λTr(KX),
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and look for its stationary points, that is for the solution of the following equa-
tion:
∇KX (log det(I+HMKXH∗M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E)− λTr(KX)) = 0
⇐⇒ ((H∗MHM )−1 +KX)−1 = ((H∗EHE)−1 +KX)−1 + λIn.
(4)
By pre-multiplying the above equation by (KX+(H
∗
MHM )
−1) and post-multiplying
it by (KX + (H
∗
EHE)
−1), we get
(H∗EHE)
−1+KX = (H∗MHM )
−1+KX+λ((H∗MHM )
−1+KX)((H∗EHE)
−1+KX),
or equivalently
((H∗EHE)
−1 − (H∗MHM )−1)
1
λ
= ((H∗MHM )
−1 +KX)((H∗EHE)
−1 +KX). (5)
Now, we have by assumption that H∗MHM ≻ 0n and H∗EHE ≻ 0n. If further-
moreKX ≻ 0, then all the eigenvalues of ((H∗MHM )−1+KX)((H∗EHE)−1+KX)
are strictly positive (see Lemma 2, in Appendix). This implies that (5) can have
a solution if and only if the Hermitian matrix ((H∗EHE)
−1 − (H∗MHM )−1) 1λ is
positive definite. This means that either H∗MHM ≻ H∗EHE and λ > 0, or
H∗MHM ≺ H∗EHE and λ < 0. This gives a contradiction if H∗MHM −H∗EHE is
either indefinite or semidefinite, implying that K˜X has to be low rank.

3 Proof of the Converse
The goal of this section is to prove the converse, namely
Theorem 2 For any sequence of (2nRs , n) codes with probability of error Pe ≤ ǫ
and equivocation rate Rs− ǫ ≤ Re for any n ≥ n(ǫ), ǫ > 0, then the secrecy rate
Rs satisfies
Rs ≤ max
KX0,Tr(KX)=P
log det(I+HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
The proof is done in three main steps, that we briefly sketch before entering
into the details.
First (subsection 3.1), we have, similarly to [7, 5] that
Rs − ǫ ≤ 1
n
[I(Xn;Y n|Zn) + δ], ǫ, δ > 0.
Thus, all the work consists of finding an upper bound on I(X ;Y |Z). We will
prove the following upper bound:
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
I˜(X ;Y |Z),
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where
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det
(
In + (H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
(
InM A
A∗ InE
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E)
and A is an nM × nE matrix which denotes the correlation between VM and
VE . At this point of the proof, the converse can be proved for the two “simple”
cases when H∗MHM ≻ H∗EHE and H∗EHE ≻ H∗MHM , which are the cases when
the channel is degraded.
In general, VM and VE are independent. However, since the secrecy capacity
does not depend on A, we can assume that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is a function of both A
and KX for the purposes of tightening our upper bound . We show (subsection
3.2) that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is actually concave in KX and convex in A. As a result, we
obtain a new upper bound
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
I˜(X ;Y |Z),
for all A such that I−AA∗ ≻ 0nE , thus
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ min
A
max
KX0
I˜(X ;Y |Z)
= max
KX0
min
A
I˜(X ;Y |Z).
Furthermore, we jointly optimize I˜(X : Y |Z) over KX and A, and compute the
optimal A˜ in closed form expression, while showing that the optimal K˜X is on
the boundary of its domain, namely, K˜X is low rank.
We conclude the proof (subsection 3.3) by showing that the converse matches
the achievability.
3.1 Bound on I(X;Y |Z) and result for the degraded case
We start by recalling a standard result, which has already been proved in [7, 5].
Lemma 1 Given any sequence of (2nRs , n) codes with Pe ≤ ǫ and Rs − ǫ ≤ Re
for any n ≥ n(ǫ), ǫ > 0, the secrecy rate Rs can be upper bounded as follows:
Rs − ǫ ≤ 1
n
[I((Xn, Y n|Zn) + δ],
for ǫ, δ > 0.
We thus focus now on finding an upper bound on I(X ;Y |Z). We provide
two approaches:
1. An upper bound is given by assuming that the legitimate receiver knows
both his channel and the one of the eavesdropper.
7
2. The same upper bound can also be obtained as follows. Clearly, I(X ;Y |Z)
is upper bounded by taking the maximum over all input distributions
P(X):
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
P(X)
I(X ;Y |Z) = max
KX0
I˜(X ;Y |Z),
where I˜(X ;Y |Z) denotes the value of I(X ;Y |Z) when P(X) is optimal.
We will prove that the optimal distribution is Gaussian.
Proposition 3 We have the following upper bound:
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ maxKX0 log det
(
In + (H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E),
where A denotes the correlation between VM and VE and satisfies I−AA∗ ≻ 0.
Proof. An upper bound on I(X ;Y |Z) is obtained by assuming that the
legitimate receiver knows both its channel and the one of the eavesdropper. In
this case, the capacity of the link between the transmitter and the legitimate
receiver is that of a MIMO system, namely
max
KX
log det
(
In + (H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
(
InM A
A∗ InE
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
.
Now the channel we consider is degraded, and an upper bound is thus the
difference of the two capacities, which yields the result.
We now provide the alternative proof. Clearly
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
P(X)
I(X ;Y |Z),
where P(X) denotes the input distribution. Now note that
I(X ;Y |Z) = h(Y |Z)− h(Y |X,Z)
= h(Y |Z)− h(X,Y, Z) + h(X,Z)
= h(Y |Z)− h(X)− h(Y, Z|X) + h(X) + h(Z|X)
= h(Y |Z)− h(VE , VM ) + h(VE).
Thus the optimization problem we have to solve is
max
P(X)
h(X + VM , X + VE)− h(X + VE).
Using Proposition 10 (see Appendix), the optimal is given by choosing X Gaus-
sian. Thus we have that
I(X ;Y |Z) = h(Y |Z)− h(VE , VM ) + h(VE)
= h(Y, Z)− h(Z)− h(VE , VM ) + h(VE),
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which, when X is Gaussian, is given by
log det(KY Z)− log det(KZ)− log det(KME) + log det(KE)
where KY Z , KZ , KME and KE = InE are covariance matrices, with
KY Z =
(
HMKXH
∗
M + InM HMKXH
∗
E +A
HEKXH
∗
M +A
∗ HEKXH∗E + InE
)
,
where A denotes the correlation between VM and VE , and
KME =
(
InM A
A∗ InE
)
.
In order for KME to be well defined, A has to satisfy I−AA∗  0.
Thus we have
log det
((
I A
A∗ I
)
+
(
HM
HE
)
KX(H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
)
− log det(HEKXH∗E + I)
− log det(KME)
= log det
(
I+
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX(H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
)
− log det(HEKXH∗E + I),
where the second equality is well defined if we further require I−AA∗ ≻ 0. The
value of I(X ;Y |Z) when X is Gaussian is denoted by I˜(X ;Y |Z):
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det
(
I+ (H∗M , H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
(6)

We can now conclude the proof of the converse for the “simple” cases when
H∗MHM ≻ H∗EHE or H∗EHE ≻ H∗MHM .
Proposition 4 1. If H∗MHM ≻ H∗EHE, we have that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
log det(I+HMKXH
∗
M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
2. Vice versa, if H∗EHE ≻ H∗MHM , we have that
I(X ;Y |Z) = 0.
Proof. Let us first compute another way of writing I˜(X ;Y |Z), as defined in
(6). Note the following factorization:(
InM A
A∗ InE
)
=
(
I A
0 I
)(
I−AA∗ 0
0 I
)(
I 0
A∗ I
)
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so that(
I A
A∗ I
)−1
=
(
I 0
−A∗ I
)(
(I−AA∗)−1 0
0 I
)(
I −A
0 I
)
and we have that
(H∗M , H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
= (H∗M−H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM−AHE)+H∗EHE .
Thus
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det(I+ ((H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) +H∗EHE)KX)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E). (7)
1. Since the secrecy capacity does not depend on the noise correlation A, and
that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX
I˜(X ;Y |Z),
for allA such that I−AA∗ ≻ 0, we are free to takeA∗ = HE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M .
Indeed, such A does not depend on a choice of KX , and since H
∗
MHM ≻
H∗EHE , A satisfies
I−AA∗ = I−HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M ≻ 0.
Finally, we are left to show that by replacing A∗ with HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗M
in I˜(X ;Y |Z) indeed yields log det(I+HMKXH∗M )−log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
Consider thus I˜(X ;Y |Z) as defined in (7). It is enough to show that
(H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) +H∗EHE = H∗MHM .
We have that
(I−AA∗)−1
= (I−HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M )−1
= I+HM (H
∗
MHM )
−1((H∗EHE)
−1 − (H∗MHM )−1)−1(H∗MHM )−1H∗M
using the matrix inversion lemma, so that
H∗M (I−AA∗)−1HM = H∗MHM + ((H∗EHE)−1 − (H∗MHM )−1)−1
= H∗MHM + (I−H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1)−1H∗EHE
and finally
(I−H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1)H∗M (I−AA∗)−1HM (I− (H∗MHM )−1H∗EHE
= H∗MHM −H∗EHE .
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2. Similarly ifH∗EHE ≻ H∗MHM , we are free to chooseA∗ = HE(H∗EHE)−1H∗M ,
which satisfies
I−AA∗ = I−HM (H∗EHE)−1H∗M ≻ 0.
Since H∗M −H∗EA∗ = 0, we see from (7) that
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = 0.

The cases described in the lemma can be understood as a simple general-
ization of the scalar case, since those are the degraded cases. When H∗MHM ≻
H∗EHE , all links to the legitimate receiver are better, and the capacity is given
by the difference of the two capacities, while if H∗EHE ≻ H∗MHM , then all links
to the eavesdropper are better, and thus no positive secrecy capacity can be
achieved.
We are now left with the case when H∗MHM −H∗EHE is indefinite, which is
the non-degraded case, and thus the interesting case to understand.
3.2 Minimization over A and maximization over KX
We have shown in Proposition 3 that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX0
I˜(X ;Y, Z).
Since this is true for all A such that I−AA∗ ≻ 0, we further have that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ min
A
max
KX
I˜(X ;Y, Z).
To understand this double optimization, we start by analyzing the function
I˜(X ;Y, Z).
Proposition 5 The function I˜(X ;Y, Z) defined in (6) is concave in KX and
convex in A. Consequently,
min
A
max
KX
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = max
KX
min
A
I˜(X ;Y |Z)
where KX and A respectively satisfy
Tr(KX) = P, KX  0, I− AA∗ ≻ 0.
Proof. Recall from (6) that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is given by
log det
(
In + (H
∗
M , H
∗
E)
(
InM A
A∗ InE
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
−log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
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1. Convexity in A. Set
C :=
(
I A
A∗ I
)
, D :=
(
HM
HE
)
KX(H
∗
M , H
∗
E).
Now I˜(X ;Y |Z) is of the form log det(InM+nE+C−1D), plus some constant
term, where D  0. It is known that log det(C) is concave in C [3,
p.74]), thus log det(C−1) = − log det(C) is convex in C, which implies
that log det(I + C−1D) is convex. Furthermore, it is convex in any block
of C, thus convex in A. Finally, the set of A such that I − AA∗ ≻ 0 is
convex.
2. Concavity in KX . Recall from (7) that
I˜(X ;Y |Z)
= log det(I+ ((H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) +H∗EHE)KX)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
Set
B := (H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I −AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) +H∗EHE .
We now have that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is given by
log det(In +BKX)− log det(In +H∗EHEKX), (8)
with B  H∗EHE .
If we compute the gradient of (8) with respect to KX , we get that
(B−1 +KX)−1 − ((H∗EHE)−1 +KX)−1  0, (9)
since B  H∗EHE . Recall that
∂(X−1)kl
∂Xij
= −(X−1)ki(X−1)jl,
so that the derivative of F := ((H∗EHE)
−1 +KX)−1 is a n2 × n2 matrix
given by 

−FF11 −FF12 . . . −FF1n
−FF21 −FF22 . . . −FF2n
...
...
−FFn1 −FFn2 −FFnn


= −((H∗EHE)−1 +KX)−1 ⊗ ((H∗EHE)−1 +KX)−1.
To check the concavity in KX , we are thus left to check that
((H∗EHE)
−1+KX)−1⊗((H∗EHE)−1+KX)−1  (B−1+KX)−1⊗(B−1+KX)−1,
which is true by (9).
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3. Since we have shown above that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is concave in KX and convex
in A, we have that
min
A
max
KX
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = max
KX
min
A
I˜(X ;Y |Z).

From the previous steps of the proof, we now know that
I(X ;Y |Z) ≤ max
KX
min
A
I˜(X ;Y |Z).
We next compute the minimization over A. Note that we can write I˜(X ;Y |Z)
in an alternative way. Recall that
I˜(X ;Y, Z) = log det(KY Z)− log det(KZ)− log det(KME).
By simplifying the Schur complement of det(KY Z) with det(KZ) = det(KX +
KE), we get that I˜(X ;Y |Z) is given by
log det(HMKXH
∗
M + InM − (HMKXH∗E +A)(HEKXH∗E + I)−1(HEKXH∗M +A∗))
− log det(InM −AA∗). (10)
Proposition 6 Let A˜∗ be a local minima of I˜(X ;Y |Z). Then
A˜∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )(V,W )
−1,
where W is an arbitrary nM × m matrix, 0 ≤ m ≤ nM , and V is an nM ×
(nM −m) matrix, such that(
V
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MV
)
is an invariant subspace of the matrix M , as defined in (11). In particular,
if m = nM , then A˜
∗ = HE(H∗EHE)
−1H∗M . Similarly, if m = 0, then A˜
∗ =
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗M .
Proof. Let M1,M2,M3, X be square complex matrices. Set
f(X) =M1 − (X +M2)M3(X∗ +M∗2 ).
It can be shown that
∇X log det(f(X)) = −f(X)−1(X +M2)M3.
Using this formula, we compute that
∇A∗ I˜(X ;Y |Z) = 0 ⇐⇒ f(A)(A∗+HEKXH∗M )−1(HEKXH∗E+I) = (I−AA∗)(A∗)−1,
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where
f(A) = HMKXH
∗
M + I− (HMKXH∗E+A)(HEKXH∗E+ I)−1(HEKXH∗M +A∗).
This yields the following nonsymmetric algebraic Ricatti equation
A∗(HMKXH∗M + I)
−1HMKXH∗EA
∗ +A∗[(HMKXH∗M + I)
−1]
+[−HEKXH∗E − I+HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKXH∗E ]A∗
+HEKXH
∗
M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1 = 0.
One way of solving an algebraic Riccati [4] of the form
0 =M21 +M22A
∗ −A∗M11 −A∗M12A∗,
is to look for invariant subspaces of
M =
(
M11 M12
M21 M22
)
.
Here we have that M is given by( −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1 −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKXH∗E
HEKXH
∗
M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1 −HEKXH∗E − I+HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKXH∗E
)
.
(11)
Set
F =
(
HMKXH
∗
M + InM 0
0 InE
)
.
We have that F (M + InM +nE ) is given by(
HMKXH
∗
M −HMKXH∗E
HEKXH
∗
M (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1 −HEKXH∗E +HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKXH∗E
)
.
It is easy to see that
F (M+I) =
( −HM
−HE +HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
)
(−KXH∗M ,KXH∗E)
which implies that −1 is an eigenvalue of M . Thus a first invariant subspace is
given by the eigenspace associated to −1, which is the kernel of M + I, or in
other words, the subspace orthogonal to (−KXH∗M ,KXH∗E):
Ker(M + I) =
(
U1
HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MU1
)
,
for any U1. Let us now look for the second invariant subspace. We first rewrite
M as
M = F−1
( −HM
−HE +HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
)
(−KXH∗M ,KXH∗E)−I.
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We now show that (
U2
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MU2
)
,
is an invariant subspace for any U2. Indeed, we have that
F−1
( −HM
−HE +HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
)
=
( −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
−HE +HEKXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
)
= −
(
I
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗M
)
(HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1HM
since
−HE(I−KXH∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM )
= −HE((H∗MHM )−1H∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−KXH∗M )(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM
= −HE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M (HMKXH∗M + I)−1HM .
Thus, a Jordan basis of M is given by(
InM InE
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗M HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M
)
.
Finally, solutions of the Ricatti equation are given by [4]
A˜∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )(V,W )
−1,
where W is an nM ×m matrix, 0 ≤ m ≤ nM , and V is a nM × nM −m matrix,
such that (
V
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MV
)
is an invariant subspace of M . Note that W can be chosen arbitrary since
(I, HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M ) is the eigenspace associated to −1.

Proposition 7 Let K˜X be an optimal solution to the optimization problem
maxKX minA I˜(X ;Y |Z)
s.t. KX  0, Tr(KX) = P,
where A˜∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1W )(V,W )−1 is the optimal
solution for the minimization over A. Then K˜X is a low rank matrix.
Proof. We have seen in (8) that I˜(X ;Y |Z) can be written
log det(I+BKX)− log det(I+HEKXH∗E),
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where
B := (H∗M −H∗EA∗)(I−AA∗)−1(HM −AHE) +H∗EHE .
Using the matrix inversion lemma, we have that
B−1 = (H∗EHE)
−1 − (H∗EHE)−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗)·
(I−AA∗ + (HM −AHE)(H∗EHE)−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗))−1(HM −AHE)(H∗EHE)−1,
so that
B−1 − (H∗EHE)−1 = −(H∗EHE)−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗)·
(I−AA∗ + (HM −AHE)(H∗EHE)−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗))−1(HM −AHE)(H∗EHE)−1.
Now
(H∗EHE)
−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗)
= (H∗EHE)
−1[H∗M −H∗E(HE(H∗MHM )−1H∗MV,HE(H∗EHE)−1W )(V,W )−1]
= [(H∗EHE)
−1H∗M (V,W )− ((H∗MHM )−1H∗MV, (H∗EHE)−1W )](V,W )−1
= (((H∗EHE)
−1 − (H∗MHM )−1)H∗MV,0)(V,W )−1
thus (H∗EHE)
−1(H∗M −H∗EA∗) is low rank and consequently B−1− (H∗EHE)−1
is.
Now, from Proposition 2, we know that either B−1 ≺ (H∗EHE)−1 and λ > 0,
or B−1 ≻ (H∗EHE)−1 and λ < 0. This gives a contradiction since B−1 
(H∗EHE)
−1, implying that K˜X has to be low rank.

Proposition 8 Knowing that the rank of K˜X is r < n, the optimal solution to
min
A
I˜(X ;Y |Z)
is given by
A∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUXV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )(BHMUXV,W )
−1
where KX = UXU
∗
X and B = (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1.
Proof. The Jordan decomposition of M is now given by
M
(
I I
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗M HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M
)
=(
I I
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗M HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M
)(
J 0
0 −I
)
.
where
J = −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1(HMKXH∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M + I).
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Let us now look more carefully at J . We first show that when KX is low rank,
−1 is an eigenvalue. Indeed, we have
−(HMKXH∗M + I)−1(HMKXH∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M + I) + I
= −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKX(H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1 − I)H∗M .
This is enough to show that −1 is an eigenvalue since det(KX) = 0 by assump-
tion that KX is low rank. The above computation also tells us that
−(HMKXH∗M + I)−1(HMKXH∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M + I)
= −(HMKXH∗M + I)−1HMKX(H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1 − I)H∗M − I.
Since KX is low rank, it can be factorized as KX = UXU
∗
X where UX is a n× r
matrix, if r < n denotes the rank of KX . Clearly, (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1HMUX is
an invariant subspace of J . A Jordan basis is thus given by
P =
(
(HMKXH∗M + I)
−1HMUX Q
)
where Q is the eigenspace associated to −1. Set B := (HMKXH∗M + I)−1. This
thus gives us a more precise Jordan basis for M (as defined in (11)), namely(
P I
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MP HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M
)
=(
BHMUX Q I
HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUX HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MQ HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗M
)
.
In this decomposition, the third block is the eigenspace of −1 of dimension nM
which is always present. The middle block also corresponds to an eigenspace of
−1, of dimension nM − r, this one appearing only when KX drops rank. The
first block is an invariant subspace, corresponding to the r eigenvalues of M
that are different from −1.
From this Jordan basis of M , we have that
A∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUXV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )(BHMUXV,W )
−1
is a solution of the Ricatti equation, where W is any nM × (nM − r) matrix,
and V is any r × r matrix.

3.3 The converse matches the achievability
So far, we have solved the optimization problem
min
A
max
KX
I˜(X ;Y |Z)
by computing the optimal A˜ in a closed form expression, and by showing that
the optimal K˜X is low rank. We are now ready to conclude the proof, by proving
that the optimal A makes the converse match the achievability.
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Proposition 9 Set B = (HMKXH
∗
M + I)
−1 and let
A∗ = (HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUXV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )(BHMUXV,W )
−1
be a solution of the Ricatti equation. Then
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det(I+HMKXH∗M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
Furthermore, there exists V,W such that I−AA∗ ≻ 0.
Proof. Recall from (6) that a way of writing I˜(X ;Y |Z) is
log det
(
I+ (H∗M , H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
KX
)
−log det(I+HEKXH∗E),
where (
I A
A∗ I
)
=
(
I 0
A∗ I
)(
I 0
0 I−A∗A
)(
I A
0 I
)
.
Thus (
I A
A∗ I
)−1
=
(
I −A
0 I
)(
I 0
0 (I−A∗A)−1
)(
I 0
−A∗ I
)
so that
(H∗M , H
∗
E)
(
I A
A∗ I
)−1(
HM
HE
)
= H∗MHM+(−H∗MA+H∗E)(I−A∗A)−1(−A∗HM+HE)
and
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det(I+H∗MHMKX + (−H∗MA+H∗E)(I −A∗A)−1(−A∗HM +HE)KX)
− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
We now show that KX is in the kernel of −A∗HM +HE . We have that
(BHMUXV,W )
−1HMKX = (HMUXV,B−1W )−1B−1HMKX
= (HMUXV,B
−1W )−1HMUXU∗X(H
∗
MHMKX + I)
=
(
V −1U∗X(H
∗
MHMKX + I)
0
)
,
so that
A∗HMKX = HE(H∗MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUXU
∗
X(H
∗
MHMKX + I)
= HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MBB
−1HMKX
= HEKX ,
and thus A∗HMKX = HEKX , so that we get
I˜(X ;Y |Z) = log det(I+HMKXH∗M )− log det(I+HEKXH∗E).
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We now have that
I−AA∗ ≻ 0
⇐⇒(
V ∗U∗XH
∗
MB
∗
W ∗
)
(BHMUXV,W )−(
V ∗U∗XH
∗
MB
∗HM (H∗MHM )
−1H∗E
W ∗HM (H∗EHE)
−1H∗E
)
(HE(H
∗
MHM )
−1H∗MBHMUXV,HE(H
∗
EHE)
−1H∗MW )  0
⇐⇒(
V ∗U∗XH
∗
MB(I−HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M )BHMUXV 0
0 W ∗(I−HM (H∗EHE)−1H∗M )W
)
≻ 0,
since
V ∗U∗XH
∗
MB
∗W − V ∗U∗XH∗MB∗HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗MW
= V ∗U∗X [H
∗
MB
∗ −H∗MB∗HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗M ]W = 0.
To conclude the proof, notice that we have
I−HM (H∗MHM )−1H∗EHE(H∗MHM )−1H∗M  0 ⇐⇒ H∗MHM  H∗EHE
and
I−HM (H∗EHE)−1H∗M  0 ⇐⇒ H∗EHE ≺ H∗MHM .
Thus if H∗MHM−H∗EHE is indefinite, there exists V andW such that the above
matrix is positive definite.

4 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of computing the perfect secrecy ca-
pacity of a multiple antenna channel, based on a generalization of the wire-tap
channel to a MIMO broadcast wire-tap channel. We proved that for an arbi-
trary number of transmit/receive antennas, the perfect secrecy capacity is the
difference of the two capacities, the one of the legitimate user minus the one of
the eavesdropper.
Appendix
Proposition 10 Let A,B be circularly symmetric complex jointly Gaussian
random vectors with strictly positive definite covariance matrices. Let X be
a random vector independent of A and B, and S be a positive definite matrix.
The optimal solution to
maxP(X) h(X +A,X +B)− h(X +B)
s.t. Tr(KX) = P
is Gaussian.
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Proof. First note that
1√
2
(
I −I
I I
)(
X +A
X +B
)
=
(
1√
2
(A−B)√
2X + 1√
2
(A+B)
)
.
Since multiplication by a unitary matrix does not change the entropy,
h(X +A,X +B)
= h
(√
2X +
1√
2
(A+B),
1√
2
(A−B)
)
= h
(√
2X +
1√
2
(A+B)| 1√
2
(A−B)
)
+h
(
1√
2
(A−B)
)
= h(
√
2X + U) + h
(
1√
2
(A−B)
)
where U is Gaussian with covariance matrix KU given by
1
2E[(A+B)(A +B)
∗]− 12E[(A+B)(A −B)∗]·
E[(A−B)(A−B)∗]−1E[(A−B)(A+ B)∗],
using conditional Gaussian distribution.
To maximize
h(X +A,X +B)− h(X +B),
we thus need to maximize
h(
√
2X + U)− h(X +B),
or equivalently
h(X + U ′)− h(X +B)
where U ′ = U/
√
2 is Gaussian, independent of X . The optimal distribution of
such expression has been shown to be Gaussian by Liu and Viswanath [15] in
the case of real Gaussian vectors. Their result can be readily extended to the
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian case.

Lemma 2 If A = A∗ ≻ 0 and B = B∗ ≻ 0, then the matrix AB has all positive
eigenvalues.
Proof. Since A ≻ 0, we can write A = A1/2(A∗)1/2 with A1/2 invertible.
Therefore,
AB = A1/2((A∗)1/2BA1/2)A−1/2,
has the same eigenvalues as the matrix (A∗)1/2BA1/2, which is positive definite.

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